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Almost two years have passed since the initial
implementation of VAT (or PDV in Croatian).  But
not even after this amount of time have the polemics
about this new form of taxation ceased; on the
contrary, in recent times they have actually been
stepped up. There have been many criticisms of the
new tax; however, an analysis of them would tend to
show that most of the complaints have referred to
the implementation of a uniform rate of taxation.
Some taxation experts, politicians, the media and the
citizenry hold that the system of VAT with a single
rate is regressive, i.e. it tends to hit the poor
relatively hard, since they spend more of their
income and save less.  In order to palliate the
regressive effect of VAT, what is almost always
recommended is the introduction of a large number
of rates (at least two), even the introduction of a zero
rating for basic necessities.  In addition,
representatives of some branches of the economy
(the tourist industry in particular) have been making
themselves heard, claiming that their survival is
threatened by the implementation of a single high
rate of VAT, and seeking the introduction of a lower
rate.
Behind these criticisms there are a number of
key questions. Is a single rate VAT regressive?
Should its regressive effect be corrected by the
introduction of several rates? Does VAT really put
the growth of certain branches of the economy at
risk? We shall attempt to give an answer to these
questions in ten theses.
1. The question of what is regressive is hard to
define unambiguously. It is questionable because it
is not a matter of indifference as to which base one
looks at – income or consumption, or to what period
the observation relates.  VAT covering most
products and services, levied at a single rate, has by
definition a proportional effect when it is measured
according to consumption and a regressive effect
when it is measured according to income.  The
reason for this is that savings as a part of income
increase when income rises.  Accordingly, when
progressiveness is discussed, there should be some
mention of what base it is observed in connection
with, consumption or income.
The conception of regressiveness also changes
when it is looked at over the long period.  Then the
burdening of income by VAT may become
proportional.  Consumption taxes (which include
VAT), as their very name implies, put a burden on
consumption and not savings.  Since savings are
deferred consumption, they are, when converted into
consumption, subject to VAT.  Thus the rich, though
they save more, are in the end not exempt from
VAT. They do pay it at the moment when they turn
their savings into consumption.  Thus, looking at it
dynamically, not statically as when just the
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household budgets of the well-to-do and the poor are
observed over the period of a single year, the
concept of regressiveness changes essentially.
When income is observed as lifetime income, then,
assuming that the whole of the income is spent by
the end of a lifetime, and that savings are not
transferred to heirs, it is equivalent to consumption.
And the proportion of VAT in income is
proportional, because VAT burdens all expenses on
consumption equally.  Rich man and poor man are
now equally burdened by VAT.  If income is
observed over the whole of a lifetime, then, and not
just as annual income, the concept of regressiveness
is questionable.  In such conditions, VAT is a
proportional burden on the income that an individual
can earn over the whole of his life.
Irrespective of this relativisation of the concept
of regressiveness, it nevertheless has to be admitted
that the concept of the regressiveness is habitually
linked with annual income, and it is then accurate to
say that a single rate of VAT burdens the poor more.
In their income, consumption forms a far greater
part than it does in the income of the wealthy.  As
against this, in poorer members of the society,
savings are regularly much smaller.  However,
proposals that this regressiveness be palliated by the
introduction of a multi-rate VAT should be resisted.
For a VAT system with several rates has a large
number of drawbacks.
2. In Croatia, it is impossible precisely to define
the extent of the regressiveness.
When VAT with a single rate of 22% was
introduced to replace turnover tax with five rates in
which the standard rate came to 26.5% (15% plus
10% retail sales service tax) there was certainly a
shift in relative prices.  What the final effect of such
changes in relative prices on various categories of
the population was is quite difficult to determine
unambiguously.  There is as yet no research of the
distribution of income and of the tax burden in
Croatia, and it is impossible to comprehend the
regressive effects of VAT.  Lack of information
about the real size of VAT regressiveness makes it
more difficult to make conclusions, and creates a
fertile ground for the work of demagogues.
Apart from this, when there is discussion of the
regressive effects of VAT, one should not forget that
there are other forms of tax that also apply
differently to the incomes of individuals. Unlike
VAT, some of these forms of tax, for example
income tax or excise taxes, have progressive
features, and they have to be taken into
consideration when the effects of taxation on
individual income groups of the population are
considered.  Also to be considered is the effect of
“negative taxes”, i.e., subsidies (various forms of
welfare) that are received by the poorest members of
the population. Thus VAT should not be considered
in isolation when discussing the impact of taxation
on the population; rather, one should take into
consideration all forms of taxation, including their
negative components, i.e., all forms of welfare.
3. Empirical research about the regressiveness
of VAT largely bears out the thesis that it cannot be
used to reduce differences.  In Ireland, for example,
it has been ascertained that in absolute terms the rich
spend twice as much on food as the poor, although
the poor spend relatively more of their income than
the rich on food.  Accordingly, the zero rating of
food in Ireland provides twice as much a tax break
for the rich as it does for the poor.  A Swedish study
showed that the abolition of the zero rating for food
would mostly benefit single people in the high
income groups, because they usually buy more
expensive food. In addition, the demand for books,
newspapers and magazines is very income elastic. In
other words, the rich buy more books and other
forms of printed matter, and a cut in the rate for
publications would make VAT still more regressive.
4. The introduction of several rates requires a
detailed definition of taxable products. If vegetables
are taxed at a reduced rate, does this mean that fresh,
canned and frozen vegetables are taxed at a single
rate or different rates?  Should there be a same rate
of VAT for lettuce and for artichokes?  Nor are all
kinds of lettuce the same, and it is then necessary to
define whether there is a need to embark on a further
distinction of products.   The process of defining the
products for different rates gets very complex and
gives rise to further discussion, most often about
borderline products that in their nature can be
taxable in terms of two different rates.  The
definition of products requires a professional and
intelligent tax administration capable of giving
clear, convincing and well-supported explanations
of its decisions in public discussions about rates that
tend to become very heated.  Thus the introduction
of several rates complicates a tax administration and
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makes it more expensive than a system with a single
rate.
5. Unclear definition of products opens up the
door to tax evasion.  This relates to all products that
are not unequivocally defined.   Taxpayers will
attempt to put them in lower rate categories.  The
use of several rates will open the door to corruption
and lobbying, for many will wish to persuade the
state to put their product in the lower rate category.
Thus powerful lobbies will get into the VAT system.
6. Increasing the number of rates will lead to an
increase in the administrative costs of collecting the
tax.  A state that uses several rates of VAT will have
to have more civil servants for the processing of
complex tax returns than a state with a single rate
VAT.  In addition, the costs of calculating and
paying VAT in the companies will also rise.   The
well known taxation expert and long-term director
of the Fiscal Department of the IMF, Vito Tanzi,
said in 1993 that with a transition from one to two
rates, the costs of VAT administration went up five
times, and with a change to three rates, ten times.
The increased costs of the tax administration and of
the compliance costs of the corporate sector in the
collection of VAT with  multiple rates should
certainly not be neglected in discussion of
introducing a lower rate of VAT.
7. Lower VAT rates are no guarantee of lower
prices.  Lower rates of VAT in tourism, for drugs
and food do not automatically mean a lowering of
prices for these products.  In a free market, prices
are formed according to supply and demand.
Traders set their prices according to the elasticity of
demand, that is, according to what the market will
bear, irrespective of the rate of taxation.
Accordingly, a lower rate of VAT is no guarantee
that the poor will pay lower prices, nor is a lower
VAT in tourism a panacea for all the problems in
this branch of the economy.  It would be very nice
indeed if all the problems in the Croatian tourist
industry could be solved through the introduction of
a lower rate of VAT.
8. Various rates of VAT distort consumer
preferences. It is usually said that lower rates for
food should be introduced because the poor spend
more on food in their household budgets than the
rich.  But the rich spend also on milk, meat and oil.
Why should such products be taxed at a lower rate,
the rich thus being helped just like the poor?   The
introduction of lower taxes for food will indirectly
subsidise the rich.
As against this, taxing luxury products at higher
rates will discourage the poor from occasionally
upgrading their consumption with the more
expensive product.  Do the poor have no right to buy
luxury products? Is the purchase of luxury products
considered the exclusive right of the rich, with
enough money to pay high taxes on such products as
well? Why introduce such discrimination into
consumption?  The poor can be helped much more
effectively with the aid of direct transfers from the
budget or by a progressive income tax.  Total
income formed in this way (earned income plus
welfare payments) will help the poor, in a single rate
VAT system, to adjust their consumption to their
own preferences, and not to the rates of taxation.
9. Lower rates of V AT mean less revenue to
the national budget.   In such a situation, the state
would very likely be forced to increase the standard
rate of VAT in order to obtain revenue adequate for
its own inelastic expenses. An increase in the
standard rate would lead to a still greater wave of
discontent, for it would be applied to the greatest
number of products and services.
Apart from this, today about 50% of budgetary
revenue is derived from VAT (Table 1), and a small
shift in the rates would bring about great changes in
the level of tax revenues.  For this reason the
Croatian Finance Ministry has to be extremely
cautious when making any decision about the
number and the amount of rates.  Reducing the rates
for some products would mean a reduction of
taxation revenue or would lead to the standard rate
being put up from 22% to some higher level, or
would lead to an increase in other types of  taxes, or
would result in a serious reduction in  budgetary
expenditures.
10. The EU is tending towards a smaller
number of rates of VAT. Many say that in the area
surrounding the Croatian economy, mainly implying
the EU, a system of VAT with several rates is
employed. This is indeed true.  Of the EU countries,
only Denmark has a single rate system, and of
OECD countries, only Japan and New Zealand have
a single rate system (Table 2). But the EU is a
community of fifteen states with different tax
systems.  Coordination of their tax systems is
underway, and comprises a painful and long-term
process in which each country feels that interference
with its taxation system is an attack on its
sovereignty.  However, the EU recommends its
members the reduction of numbers of rates of VAT
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so that there are only two: a standard one of 15%
and a reduced one, of not lower than 5%. The EU
too, then, is tending towards a single rate, and the
end result of this long lasting process is certain to be
a single rate.   This is possible to state with a great
amount of certainty because contemporary taxation
theory has on the whole unambiguously and
unanimously opted for the adoption of single-rate
VAT with a small number of exemptions and zero
ratings and a broad tax base.  EU countries
introduced VAT in the sixties and seventies, when
the attitude towards a single rate was not so explicit.
Their aim was that the tax burden should be as
similar as possible to that with the sales tax in order
to facilitate acceptance of a completely new form of
taxation of consumption, a form that until then had
never been implemented.  In Croatia a taxation
system founded on the experience of EU countries
should be retained, and VAT in its best form be
continued, which certainly means a system with a
single rate.
Convinced that the regressiveness of VAT can
be palliated with the application of a number of
rates, the transition countries, guided primarily by
political motives, have largely introduced multi-rate
VAT systems (Table 3).  Unfortunately, they have
not paid attention to foreign experience about the
drawbacks of multi-rate systems, and they are now
burdened with a number of problems, of the kind
entailed by such systems on the countries that were
the first to introduce VAT.
Finally, it should be said that the comparison of
a tax in several different countries does not have a
great deal of point.  A correct approach would
involve a comparison of the entire taxation system,
and also of the welfare system.
Conclusion
Although we are aware of the regressive effect
of a single-rate VAT, at the same time we are
convinced that VAT should not be used to attain
objectives that it cannot address in the most
satisfactory manner.  The aim of the tax is to gather
revenue by taxing consumption, not to carry out
measures of welfare or industrial policy. Its
regressive effects must be corrected by other
instruments of the fiscal system, such as direct
transfers from the budget in the form of welfare aid
to the poor, and progressive income tax and other
forms of taxation.  Economic theory and practice
show that the application of target measures that are
aimed at a clearly selected group of citizens is much
more effective and cheaper for the budget than
general, unselective measures that, intended to help
just some, also assist those who do not need help.
The introduction of several rates of VAT will not do
away with its regressive effect, but will also
obliquely subsidise the rich.  A several-rate system
is a clumsy way of palliating the regressive effects
of a single-rate VAT system.  The good features of a
single-rate VAT, such as neutrality and collection
efficiency should not be sacrificed to introduce a
much more complicated form with several rates that
will introduce new distortions in to the market and
additionally exacerbate the problem of the optimal
allocation of resources.  The aim of reducing the
overall tax burden, which came in 1997 to as high as
50% of GDP (expenditures of general government as
a percentage of GDP) and which is still rising can be
achieved by a change in other taxes: reduction of the
standard rate of VAT from 22% to a lower rate or by
reducing the contributions rate, which greatly
increases the costs of labour. But a precondition for
a permanent reduction in taxation pressure is a
reduction in budgetary expenditure.   This relates in
particularly to the great, accumulated problems in
the retirement pension and health-care insurance
funds. Beginning to make reforms in these areas will
have a crucial importance for a reduction in national
expenditure, which will in turn allow a reduction in
the tax burden.
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Table 1. BUDGETARY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAX  REVENUE
Current prices, 000 000 kuna
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 Tax revenue 22.377,48 26.505,35 28.530,43 31.338,17 40.327,49
    Income tax 3.211,61 3.497,59 4.216,93 4.102,23 4.915,10
    Profits tax 591,59 1.009,07 1.271,18 1.785,26 2.461,15
    Real estate sales tax 117,67 141,76 171,78 242,70 270,92
    Tax on sales of goods and services 14.920,74 17.762,70 18.895,16 20.538,00 27.968,26
       VAT 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 20.228,23
       Turnover tax 13.107,16 12.802,26 13.504,37 15.133,17 1.972,05
       Excise 1.813,58 4.960,44 5.390,79 5.404,83 5.767,98
    International trade tax 3.486,77 3.922,48 3.942,44 4.639,99 4.256,33
    Other taxes 49,11 171,76 32,94 29,99 455,74
Structure of tax revenue
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 Tax revenue 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,00 100,00
    Income tax 14,4 13,2 14,8 13,09 12,19
    Profits tax 2,6 3,8 4,5 5,70 6,10
    Real estate sales tax 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,77 0,67
    Tax on sales of goods and services 66,7 67,0 66,2 65,54 69,35
       VAT 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 50,16
       Turnover tax 58,6 48,3 47,3 48,29 4,89
       Excise 8,1 18,7 18,9 17,25 14,30
    International trade tax 15,6 14,8 13,8 14,81 10,55
    Other taxes 0,2 0,6 0,1 0,10 1,13
As percentage of GDP
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 Tax revenue 25,6 26,9 26,4 25,5 29,7
    Income tax 3,7 3,6 3,9 3,3 3,6
    Profits tax 0,7 1,0 1,2 1,5 1,8
    Real estate sales tax 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2
    Tax on sales of goods and services 17,1 18,1 17,5 16,7 20,6
       VAT 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 14,9
       Turnover tax 15,0 13,0 12,5 12,3 1,5
       Excise 2,1 5,0 5,0 4,4 4,3
    International trade tax 4,0 4,0 3,7 3,8 3,1
    Other taxes 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,3
GDP 87.441,20 98.382,00 107.980,60 122.904,50 135.645,20
Source: Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia
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Table 2. Current VAT rates in OECD countries Table 3.    VAT rates in Central and
Eastern Europe
Country Reduced rate Standard Higher rate Country Reduced rate Standard rate
Austria 1 10;12 20 Bulgaria - 22
Belgium 0;1;6;12 21 Czech R. 5 22
Canada 0 7 Estonia 0 18
Denmark - 25 Hungary 0;12 25
Finland 0;6;12;17 22 Latvia - 18
France 2,1;5,5 20,6 Lithuania - 18
Germany 7 15 Poland 0;7;17 22
Greece 2 4;8 18 Romania 0;9 18
Iceland 14 24,5 Slovakia 6 23
Ireland 0;2,5;10;12,5 21 Slovenia 8 19
Italy 4;10;16 19
Japan 3 - 3 Source:  Cnosen, Sijbren (1999) in Rose,
Luxembourg 3;6;12 15 Reform for Countries in Transition to
Mexico 0;10 15 nomies", Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart,
Holland 6 17,5 For Slovenia: "Denar", vol .IX, 15.
New Zealand 4 - 12,5
Norway 0 23
Portugal 5 5;12 17
Spain 4;7 16
Sweden 6;12 25
Switzerland 2 6,5
Turkey 1;8 15 23;40
United 0;2,5;8 17,5
Source: "Consumption Tax Trends", OECD, Paris, 1997.
1)  A rate of 16% is applied in the Austrian tax enclaves Mittelberg and Junghollen
2)  In some outlying parts of the country the taxation rate is reduced by 30%.
3)  3% up to March 1997; 5% from April 1, 1997
4)  For long-term lease of commercial property, standard rate VAT is collected on 60% of the value of the property.
5)  From July 1996 the reduced rate of 12% has been applied to restaurant services and for some food products (and
from October 1 expanded to cover other food products).
6)  Standard rate applied at a reduced value of some artworks, ancient and collectors’ objects, which makes the
effective rate 2.5%.
